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Abstract—Radio frequency (RF) sensors are used alongside
other sensing modalities to provide rich representations of the
world. Given the high variability of complex-valued target
responses, RF systems are susceptible to attacks masking true
target characteristics from accurate identification. In this work,
we evaluate different techniques for building robust classification
architectures exploiting learned physical structure in received
synthetic aperture radar signals of simulated 3D targets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Active sensors (i.e., radar) can provide autonomous systems
with a rich representation of the physical world, which can
be used to augment the information collected from traditional
static sensors (i.e., cameras). As a radio frequency sensor,
radar offers unique capabilities to accurately measure physical
attributes that other sensors cannot, such as range to target,
radial velocity, and other physical characteristics [1]. Radar
can be used to help with scene characterization and automatic
target recognition (ATR) to classify different detected targets
(e.g., cars, pedestrians, obstacles) in the presence of different
types of clutter (buildings, trees, other noise sources).
ATR using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a common
radar application for classifying targets using a sensor mounted
on moving vehicles such as aircraft and automobiles. ATR
has long been performed with handcrafted features [2], an
approach that has begun to give way to data-driven approaches
following the success of deep learning architectures in image
classification [3]–[5]. However, recent applications of these
techniques to radar problems do not explicitly account for the
rich physical properties of the signals provided for classifica-
tion [6]–[8]. Using simulated radio wave interactions with 3D
targets, we train a model that approximates the relationship
between the radar signal response and underlying target class.
Machine learning models have been shown to be vulner-
able to adversarial attacks in which inputs to the model
are purposely manipulated in order to produce erroneous
results [9]. In response, numerous methods have been proposed
for generating attacks, building defenses, and measuring the
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robustness of algorithms to adversarial perturbations [10]–
[13]. SAR systems may also be susceptible to attack given
the high variability of possible complex-valued signatures for
a given target. This variability results from a number of factors,
including diverse environments, sensor parameters, viewing
geometries, clutter, target shapes and materials, all of which
impact the signal returned to the radar. This variability is
difficult to model, and hence difficult to incorporate into the
training data for a given radar system. Further, this high
variability of possible target signatures leaves opportunity for
radar systems to be fooled by an adversary.
In this work, we evaluate a suite of techniques for building
ATR architectures that intend to be robust to adversarial at-
tacks. The techniques we consider include conditional training
based on target pose estimation, feature similarity embedding,
and adversarial learning by perturbing the complex-valued
target response before processing the image. We evaluate these
techniques using physics-based simulations of SAR images for
a target shape classification problem, and demonstrate their
ability to increase the robustness (and accuracy) of our radar
classifier.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Neural Networks
Neural networks, most notably those used in applications
of Deep Learning, have emerged as effective near-universal
approximators of complex systems and functions. The primary
unit of a neural network is called a neuron. A neuron, or node,
can be described as a non-linear mapping over a weighted
linear combination of other nodes or some external input. As
such, the output of a collection of nodes, described as a layer
in the network, can be represented as
x˜(k+1) = σ
(
W˜ (k) · x˜(k) + w(k)b
)
(1)
where x˜(k) ∈ Rn is the input vector, W˜ (k) ∈ Rm×n is the
weight matrix and w(k)b is the weight bias of the k
th layer of
the network. σ(·) is an element-wise nonlinear mapping, often
called an activation function that controls for translational
invariance as well as introducing the capability of modeling
more complex behavior. The output vector x˜(k+1) ∈ Rn is
then used as input to the next layer in the network. The
collection of all weight matrices and biases across the layers
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of a network are known as the parameters of the network and
may be represented by the variable Θ.
For notation purposes, we subsume the biases w(·)b into the
weight matrices and augment the input x by adding a 1 as
an additional dimension. Thus the parameters of the layer k
can be compactly represented by the matrix W (k). The final
output of an N -layer neural network can be formulated as
yˆ = fΘ(x) = σ
(
W (N) · σ
(
W (N−1) · · ·σ
(
W (0) · x
)))
(2)
The network parameters Θ are “learned” through optimiza-
tion to approximate an unknown function f : RnI → RnO .
This is done by a process called training in which the
calculated state of the output yˆ is compared to target values,
y, corresponding to the datum as input to the network, x. The
total deviation from the target value is termed as the error of
the neural network, the signal of which is then used to update
Θ. The standard algorithm for propagating the error through
the network is known as backpropagation [14].
Based on the application there are various approaches to
measure this error, known as the loss function. In practice,
the loss function and hyperparameters used by the backprop-
agation algorithm are the most important aspects, followed
by the structure of the nodes and edges that make up the
computation graph, of training an accurate neural network and
learning a good representation of the collected data. Depending
on the complexity of the defined neural network, difficultly
of learning the representation of the data, the size of the
data set used to train the neural network, etc. influences the
number of iterations needed for the backpropagation algorithm
to optimize the parameters Θ appropriately.
B. Robustness and Adversarial Perturbations
The goal of any machine learning task is to train the
algorithm to perform well on data in the training set, while
maintaining performance on data it has not seen before (i.e.,
maintain high in-sample and out-of-sample accuracy). This
property is referred to as generalization [15]. Out-of-sample
performance can be estimated by using a separate test set that
is withheld from the training process, or through performing
cross-validation of the training set.
A second property that is desired of a machine learning
algorithm is that it will maintain its performance given small
perturbations to its inputs. It is this property that has been
found to be violated in many instances by adversarial pertur-
bations [9], [16]. An adversarial perturbation for a correctly
classified input, x, is a small perturbation, r satisfying ‖r‖ < ,
that when applied to the input results in an incorrect classi-
fication decision, i.e., fΘ(x + r) 6= fΘ(x) (see Figure 1). A
classifier for which adversarial perturbations exist for many
of its examples is not considered robust since the model can
easily be fooled by small changes to the inputs.
Once a classifier has been trained, an adversarial perturba-
tion for a given input x can be found by using a gradient-based
optimization procedure to search for minimum perturbations
to the input that maximize the loss function. Methods range
Fig. 1. Notional classifier with adversarial perturbation (red arrow) applied
to one of the green samples.
from quick approximations that take only a single gradient step
such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10], to solving
the full optimization problem as in [17]. While FGSM is not
guaranteed to find an adversarial example, solving the full
optimization problem is nontrivial, so in [11] the authors pro-
pose an alternative method, called DeepFool, that iteratively
projects the input onto the decision boundary of the locally-
linearized classification model. Once adversarial perturbations
have been found, they can be used in a robustness metric or to
create additional training examples for the classifier. Training
on adversarial examples, referred to as adversarial learning,
has been shown to increase robustness [10].
In general, there is a trade-off between accuracy and ro-
bustness for any given classifier. Optimization techniques used
during model training tend to craft highly complex decision
boundaries in an attempt to precisely differentiate between
each class. Such precision leads to greater accuracy yet in-
troduces some deficiencies as those final, tough to classify
data points now lie close to the decision boundary, only
needing to be “nudged” slightly in order to be misclassified.
In this manner, a highly accurate model may not be robust.
By optimizing for robustness, any decision boundary learned
to separate the classes is effectually kept from becoming too
precise. While less accurate, a robust model is likely far more
reliable in execution.
III. AUTOMATIC TARGET RECOGNITION WITH SYNTHETIC
APERTURE RADAR
We focus on data derived from simulating an airborne
SAR, which produces a high-resolution representation of the
scene in range and cross-range [1]. Similar to the data set
generated in [18], we consider the SAR scenario illustrated
in Figure 2 with an example input image for an hourglass-
shaped target. The target shapes we consider are described
in detail Section IV-B. The aircraft flies in a circular orbit
around the target of interest while sending Linear Frequency
Modulated (LFM) pulses to the target, and collecting the
received backscattered pulses. A SAR image is generated
from the complex-valued frequency history of a given orbital
segment using back-projection around the target (i.e., spotlight
extraction). The goal of the ATR classifier is to determine the
target class given the normalized magnitude of the image.
Fig. 2. Notional ATR with SAR scenario (top) with simulated SAR image
for an hourglass target (bottom)
A. Overview of SAR
The principle behind SAR is is to use a traditional mono-
static radar with a LFM pulse that provides high range resolu-
tion and utilize the motion path of the host platform to produce
an “simulated” large aperture that can also provide high
cross-range resolution. Without the motion path the angular
resolution of the mono-static processed data will be coarse.
For a SAR platform following a motion path, and observing
a stationary target, the antenna phase center is defined as,
Xp = [xp, yp, zp] (3)
where there are p = 1, . . . , Np collects across the across the
synthetic aperture. The distance to the radar phase center is
then given by
Rp =
√
(xp − x0)2 + (yp − y0)2 + (zp − z0)2 (4)
where the position of the stationary target is X0 = [x0, y0, z0]
defined to be the geometric center of the target shape. The
output of the receiver at time tp is a sequence of frequency
samples delayed by the round trip time between the transmitted
signal and the back-scattered response of the target. There are
K frequency samples per received signal denoted by fk. The
received signal for each sequence can formulated as
Ek,p = ET (fk) exp (−i4pifkRp/c) (5)
where ET is the complex response for target T and Rp is
the distance to the phase center defined above. There exists
a number of techniques to convert these complex valued
frequency histories into a 2D image. We utilize the back-
projection algorithm described in [19].
B. Target Classification Architecture
Given a set of complex valued frequency histories across a
synthetic aperture illuminating a single target, S = {Ek,p|k =
1, . . . ,K and p = 1, . . . , Np}, execute the back-projection
algorithm to produce the complex valued image,
xc = backprojection(S). (6)
A real-valued image is required for the target classification
architecture, we apply the following conversion,
x = (20 log10(|xc|)− µ)/D, (7)
where µ is the mean value of the magnitude in decibels for
the data set and D is set such that most of the values of x fall
within the range of [−1, 1].
The input image, x, is assumed to only contain a single
target of class y out C different target classes. To classify the
target within the processed image, execute a neural network
consisting of a feature extractor, f : RN×N → RM , and
classifier, c : RM → RC , given by,
h = f(x; Θf ), (8)
yˆ = c(h; Θc), (9)
where yˆ is the estimated class probability vector. The functions
f and c are neural networks whose parameters, Θf and Θc,
are estimated by minimizing by the following cross-entropy
loss using a form of backpropagation,
Lclf (x, y; Θf ,Θc) = −
P∑
i
yˆi log(yi). (10)
C. Robustness Techniques
a) Pose Estimation: The first approach we consider to
improve robustness and provide better feature learning is to
jointly estimate the target class and pose, θ ∈ [0, 2pi], which
is the angle between the target body axis and radar line-
of-sight (see Figure 2). Joint training may improve feature
learning by forcing the neural network to output features that
best represent the information needed to classify a target and
estimate its pose.
We discretize the angle into T bins and use the categorical
distribution to estimate the pose, θˆ, via a neural network,
θˆ = p(h; Θp) , θ ∈ RT . (11)
The parameters of the pose estimator is trained along with
the feature and classification parameters by minimizing an
additional loss function,
Lpose(x, y; Θp) = −
T∑
i
θˆi log(θi) (12)
b) Similarity Embedding: It is expected that similar
inputs will result in feature vectors that are close given a
distance metric. Learning a feature space that embeds this
property will improve classifier robustness to small changes
in target phenomenology (see appendix of [12]). Similarity
depends on the specific application; for ATR using SAR, we
define input similarity based on three properties: 1) targets
belong to the same class, 2) targets have similar size, and 3)
the targets have similar pose. To embed similarity into our
network, we define a binary similarity label, s, (0 if inputs
are similar, 1 if not) and consider the contrastive loss between
two extracted feature vectors h1 and h2, from separate SAR
images x1 and x2,
Lsim(h1, h2, s; Θf ) = (1−s)‖h1−h2‖22+smin(1−‖h1−h2‖2, 0)2.
(13)
This loss is minimized in conjunction with the classification
loss.
c) Adversarial Learning: Adversarial Learning with
FGSM [10] has shown an ability to improve the robustness of a
classification model. We utilize FGSM to perturb the complex-
valued target frequency history before back-projection, provid-
ing a more ”“ealistic” adversarial perturbation of the target
response and aiming to improve robustness against small
variations in a target’s complex-valued phenomenology. That
is, for a radar, we want to consider perturbations of the signal
being received at the sensor rather than on the “pixels” of
the input image to the target classifier. To do this, define the
signal processing function, x = g(s), that takes the received
signal, s, and processes the signal through the back-projection
algorithm and normalizing functions defined in Equations 6
and 7. The perturbation defined by FGSM is given by,
η = sign(∇xLclf (x = g(s), y; Θf ,Θc)). (14)
Then the perturbed input image the neural network is
x′FGSM = g(s+ η). (15)
For adversarial training, we minimize the additional loss
term,
Ladv(x
′
FGSM, y; Θf ,Θc) = −
P∑
i
yˆ′i log(yi) (16)
where y is the label of the original image, x, and yˆ′i is the
label of the perturbed image, x′FGSM.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Data
The data set consists of 715 unique 3D targets of various
size corresponding to four shape classes shown in Figure 3:
cylinder, cone, dome-cylinder, and hour-glass. For each indi-
vidual target, 1000 SAR images are generated, resulting in a
total of 715,000 images1 to train and test our classifiers. This
data set varies the target pose θ, radar altitude a, orbital radius
r, initial orbit location ϕ0, and background noise as shown in
1This data set is being prepared for public release with accompanying
technical details on how the images are generated and processed as well as
how one can go about exploiting the physical structure of the radar signals
Fig. 3. Description of shapes in data set.
Figure 2. Each SAR image represents a six meter window in
the xy-plane with 160 samples (depiction of SAR scenario and
sample image shown in Figure 2). The normalizing parameters
in Equation 7 are µ = −40 and D = 50.
B. RF Simulation
This data set utilizes four different shape classes that are
depicted in Figure 3. These shapes are modeled in 3D by
assuming the targets are symmetric along the body-axis (roll
symmetric). To generate a random sample of target shapes we
define the distribution of parameters shown in Figure 3 as:
L ∼ U [1, 4] (17)
D ∼ U [1, 2] (18)
D1 ∼ U [1, 2] (19)
D2 ∼ U [1, 2] (20)
LC = L/2 + 0.1 (21)
DC = 0.1. (22)
The distribution of parameters are defined to challenge a
classification algorithm to estimate the shape class independent
of the objects sizes. In addition to modeling the geometric
shape, half the samples will include basic “ring” (e.g., notch
or groove) randomly along the body axis and is also roll
symmetric.
We utilize an RF simulation tool developed internally to
provide the frequency response for a given look angle and
target shape. The simulations utilize Geometric Diffraction
Theory (GDT) [20] to model the responses for a select number
of scattering centers for a given shape. GDT is applicable in
the high frequency region we focus on in this data set, the
electromagnetic field can be written as
E(fk, sn) = A(fk, sn, θ) exp (−i4pifkrn/c) (23)
where there are K frequency samples per signal denoted by
fk, sn is the scattering center at a given range rn, A(fk, sn, θ)
is the complex amplitude response of the scattering center for
given line-of-sight θ to the radar (see Figure 4), and c is the
speed of light constant. See [21] and [22] for an example of
how to model the complex amplitude of cones.
Fig. 4. Description of line-of-sight.
An RF simulation is conducted for a randomly sampled
shape, frequencies, and rotation angles about the geometric
center of the object. For this data set, the center frequency
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ACCURACY AND ROBUSTNESS RESULTS OF AUGMENTED CLASSIFIERS FOR ATR WITH SAR
Accuracy Robustness
BASIC 0.896 ± 0.011 0.0201 ± 0.0011
POSE 0.899 ± 0.009 0.0209 ± 0.0006
SIM 0.921 ± 0.013 0.0204 ± 0.0008
POSE+SIM 0.912 ± 0.013 0.0204 ± 0.0018
ADV 0.871 ± 0.006 0.0213 ± 0.0011
ADV+SIM 0.889 ± 0.005 0.0224 ± 0.0026
is 24 GHz, bandwidth is B = 0.5 GHz, and the number of
frequency samples is K = 64. A simulation for a sampled
target, T , is then given by
EPT (fk, φ) =
N∑
n=1
A(fk, sn, θ) exp (−i4pifkrn/c) (24)
where the scattering center range, rn, is defined to be relative
to the geometric center of the target, and P is one of the four
possible polarization combinations: HH, HV, VH, and VV. For
images generated in this paper, we utilize the circular polarized
signal: ET = 0.5(EHHT + E
V V
T ).
C. Target Classification Model
The feature extraction architecture is a simple convolutional
neural network (CNN) with layers C(16, 20, 1, 0) - C(32, 3,
2, 1) - C(64, 3, 2, 1) - C(128, 3, 2, 1) - C(256, 3, 2, 1) - P(5),
where C(n, k, s, p) is a convolution layer followed by a ReLU
non-linearity where n is the number of output channels, k is
the kernels size in both dimensions, s is the stride, and p is
the padding. The last layer is an average pooling layer with a
kernel size such that the output is a vector of size 256.
The classifier function is a fully connected neural network
of two linear layers: L(64) followed by a ReLU, and L(4)
followed by a soft-max layer.
The pose estimator is a fully connected neural network of
two linear layers: L(64) followed by a ReLU, and L(180)
followed by a soft-max. We discretize the angle space into
T = 180 angle bins.
D. Evaluation Metrics
We perform 4-fold cross-validation to train and estimate
the out-of-sample accuracy of each classifier. To evaluate the
robustness of a classifier to adversarial perturbations, we use
the metric, ρˆadv(f), introduced in [11]:
ρˆadv(f) =
1
|D|
∑
xD
‖rˆ(x)‖2
‖x‖2 . (25)
‖ · ‖2 represents the Euclidean (i.e., L2) norm. The minimum
adversarial perturbation, rˆ(x), for each SAR image, x, in
the validation data set, D, is computed using the DeepFool
algorithm. When comparing two classifiers, if ρˆadv(f1) >
ρˆadv(f2), we conclude classifier f1 is more robust than f2.
Fig. 5. Accuracy (top) and Robustness (bottom) results of the described
classification architectures for ATR of the simulated SAR images
E. Results
We compare the basic architecture of feature extractor
followed by classifier (BASIC) with the following augmented
training schemes: pose estimation (POSE), similarity em-
bedding (SIM), pose estimation and similarity embedding
(POSE+SIM), adversarial learning with FGSM (ADV), and
adversarial learning and similarity embedding (ADV+SIM).
Overall results are shown in Table I.
Each of the augmented training techniques leads to an
increase in robustness over the basic classifier. Adversarial
learning with FGSM with similarity embedding has the highest
robustness to adversarial perturbations, which is expected
because this approach directly optimizes a loss function that
applies small perturbations to the classifier input. However,
since FGSM is a form of regularization, adversarial learning
results in a slight drop in accuracy compared to the basic
classifier. On the other hand, pose estimation and similarity
embedding both result in increases in accuracy. We theorize
that by conditioning the classifier on information such as pose
and similarity properties, we learn more effective representa-
tions of the data and hence achieve higher accuracy.
Since each image is a randomly sampled target with a
random pose (or look angle), results can be broken down to
performance across this viewing angle (see Figure 4). Figure 5
illustrates the varying performance of the classifiers binned
across five different viewing geometries. Front and front/side
viewing angles provide the highest amount variability between
each of the four object shapes and therefore we expect higher
accuracy over other viewing geometries. Since all shapes look
similar in the rear viewing geometry, e.g., the base of the
cone and cylinder, we expect a drop in accuracy compared to
front viewing. For robustness, there is a drop in performance
around broadside geometries. Broadside is usually specular in
nature and therefore exhibits little phenomenology to classify
shape, therefore small variations in the signal can lead to miss-
classification. Examining the behavior across the different
training methods, adversarial learning clearly improves the
robustness of the classifier over all viewing angles while
reducing the overall accuracy. Yet, the results demonstrate that
adding similarity embedding to adversarial learning improves
the robustness while also improving the accuracy over basic
adversarial learning. Adding pose is expected to improve ac-
curacy and remains to be seen in future analyses if robustness
also improves.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we present a convolutional neural network
architecture and selection of training techniques for learning
accurate and robust representations of 3D targets in active
sensing environments, such as radar. We investigate these
techniques using a simulated SAR for ATR scenario, and
find adversarial learning to be the approach that achieves the
highest robustness to adversarial attack, while pose estimation
with similarity embedding increases the robustness while also
achieving the highest accuracy. Future work will include in-
corporating additional robustness metrics, performing similar
analysis on other existing radar data sets (e.g., MSTAR [2]),
and exploring the applicability of generative modeling for ad-
versarial data augmentation that avoid the need to calculate the
gradient. In-line with other current work, we are developing
generative models, such as Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN) [23], to sample simulated radar observations that are
within the target distribution but fool our classifiers [6], [13].
We hypothesize that training with these generative models will
help increase robustness in data-starved radar applications.
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